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Neeley: The Constitutional Right To Suicide

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To SUICIDE,
THE QUALITY OF LIFE, AND THE "SLIPPERY-SLOPE":
AN EXPLICIT REPLY To LINGERING CONCERNS

by
DR. G. STEVEN NEELEY*

It is a shame when the soul is first to give way in this life, and the body
does not give way.'
- Marcus Aurelius

the wise man
For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly,
2
will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can.
- Seneca

The thought of suicide is a powerful comfort: it helps one through many
a dreadful night.'
- Nietzsche

INTRODUCTION

Technological innovations in the medical sciences have granted us a
higher quality of life than ever before.' A mounting concern is the effect this
same technology is having upon the quality of dying.5 It is now possible to
sustain human existence far beyond the point where the competent adult might

* Assistant Professor, Saint Francis College, Loretto, Pennsylvania. B.S.B.A., 1980, Xavier
University, Cincinnati, Ohio; J.D., 1985, University of Cincinnati; M.A., 1987, University of
Cincinnati; Ph.D., 1989, University of Cincinnati.
1. MARCUS AURELIUS, Meditations, in MARCUS AURELIUS AND His TIMES 61 (G. Long
trans., 1973).
2. SENECA, AD LUCILIUM EPISTULAE MORALES 59 (Richard M. Gummere trans., 1934).
3. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in BASIC WRITINGS OF NIETZSCHE 281
(Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed., 1968).
4. An earlier version of this paper was presented on the West Virginia Philosophical Society
Conference in the Spring of 1991. 1 would similarly like to express my gratitude to Peter
Lang Publishing for permission to use selected excerpts from my forthcoming book: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE: A LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION (in press,
manuscript on file with author).
5. See It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988); Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A
Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991); Sidney H.
Wanzer et al., The Physician'sResponsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients:A Second Look,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989).
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rationally conclude that life is no longer worth living.6 Nevertheless, the
current state of the law often makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the individual to exercise unfettered control over the circumstances of dying.7 The
common law has long recognized the right of the individual to be free from
non-consensual invasions of bodily integrity and this right has been extended
to include the freedom to refuse necessary life-saving medical treatment.8 But
the law has equally long been anathematic to suicide9 and twenty-six states
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico presently have statutes which prohibit
assisting a suicide. 1°
The accepted legal definition of suicide includes: "[s]elf-destruction;
the deliberate termination of one's own life;" "the act of self-destruction by
a person sound in mind and capable of measuring his moral responsibility." 12
Yet decisions to disemploy life-support are easily swept under the same rubric, and situations have developed in which even seriously ill competent
adults have found it nearly impossible to compel the removal of invasive lifesupport apparatus. 3 Moreover, any decision, however rational and humane,
6. As Justice Scalia observed in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990), society is faced with "the constantly increasing power of science to keep the
human body alive for longer than any reasonable person would want to inhabit it." Id. at 292
(Scalia, J., concurring). Note also, that the American Medical Association has recently
estimated that "approximately 70% of all Americans will face a decision to refuse lifesustaining treatment for themselves or a family member at some point in their lives." Edward
A. Lyon, Note, The Right to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the
ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 58 U. CtN. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (1990).
7. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983);

Anne Marie Gaudin, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: To Die or Not to
Die: That is the Question - But Who Decides? 51 LA.L. REV. 1307 (1991).

8. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960). Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
9. Keith Burgess-Jackson, The Legal Status of Suicide in Early America: A Comparison
with the English Experience, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 57, 60 (1982).
10. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 97
(1985). Moreover, "[t]hree additional states would apparently hold one who assisted a suicide
... guilty of murder as a principal," while at least two more states would likely "penalize
assisting suicide under the common law of crimes." Id. Indiana and Hawaii "make causing
suicide an offense but do not prohibit [assisting suicide]." Id. at 98. All told, only nine states
have "no prohibitions" regarding suicide. Id.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
12. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1822 (2d ed. 1979).
13. See generally Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993); Bouvia v. Superior

Court, 225 Cal Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986), review denied (Cal. 1986); Bartling v. Superior
Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Rodas, No. 86 PR. 139 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa
County, Jan. 22, 1987); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978), affd., 379
So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re State v. McAfee 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt,
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to deliberately ease the transition into death is apt to constitute suicide in the
patient who consents and assisted suicide, or even murder, in the agent who
administers.1'

As a reaction to this expanding problem, a number of legal scholars have
argued for the recognition of a constitutional right to suicide which would protect the right of the individual - at least under certain circumstances - to terminate her own existence. 5 Judicial recognition of a fundamental human
right to suicide would subject state legislation infringing this right to "strict
scrutiny analysis."' 6 Offending legislation would thus have to be necessary
to advance some compelling state interest 7 and be narrowly drawn so as to
constitute the least restrictive means available to sustain its compelling purpose. 8 The upshot of such a right would be to ensure that no mentally competent adult could be forced to remain alive against her will and best interests.
The courts and commentators have traditionally identified four state interests that may limit a persons' right to refuse life-saving medical treatment:
preserving live, preventing suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession, and protecting innocent third parties.' 9 But many courts and

801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp.

455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
14. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE

SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

318 (1970).

In particular, see People v. Kevorkian, No. 90-3909637-AZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Feb. 5, 1991).
15. See, e.g., Alan Sullivan, A Constitutional Right to Suicide: in SUICIDE: THE
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 229 (M. Pabst Battin & Davide J. Mayo eds., 1980); H. Tristram
Engelhardt & Michele Malloy, Suicide and Assisting Suicide: A Critiqueof Legal Sanctions,

36 Sw. L.J. 1003 (1982); G. Steven Neeley, Patient Autonomy and State Intervention:
Reexamining the State's PurportedInterest, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 235 (1992); David A.J. Richards,
ConstitutionalPrivacy, the Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A MoralAnalysis, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 327 (1981); James Bopp, Is Assisted Suicide ConstitutionallyProtected?, 3
ISSUES L & MED. 113 (1987). But see Marazen, supra note 10.
16. The key to invoking "strict scrutiny analysis" is the assertion that the state's practice
infringes a "fundamental right." As a general matter, fundamental rights are those explicitly
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights or otherwise implied but not expressly articulated in the
Constitution's text. In seeking to ascertain which rights might legitimately be deemed
"fundamental," the Supreme Court has typically employed the nebulous rubric of two landmark
decisions. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), it was said that this category includes
those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed." Id. at 325-26. But in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), fundamental rights are characterized
as those liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 503.
17. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395
U.S. 621 (1969).
18. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
19. In re Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla.
1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980); Commissioner of Corrections v. Meyers,
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scholars appear to be motivated by yet another and more implicit concern with
the so-called "quality of life" argument. This argument suggests that once the
legislature or judiciary begins to consider the quality of a persons' life, then
a dangerous precedent exists for the state-imposed "extermination" of all
20
persons whose "quality of life" does not measure up to sufficient standards .
This ofttimes subtle design ultimately proves to be nothing more than a variation of the "slippery-slope" argument. This paper will contend that such arguments are logically fallacious and, at best, sway only by emotional appeal.
As such, this style of argument should be afforded little forensic weight as it
serves only to further confuse the debate over the constitutionality of selfdirected death.
THE "SLIPPERY-SLOPE"

In abstract terms, the "slippery-slope" argument typically exemplifies
two basic forms, one logical, the other psychological. The logical form of the
"slippery-slope" argument is an instance of the reductio ad absurdum technique. The proposition at issue is shown to logically entail other propositions
which are either 'absurd' or else antecedently unacceptable to the person who
advocates the initial proposition."'" As Rachels provides: "[t]he logical form
of the argument goes like this. Once a certain practice is accepted, from a
399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In re, Conroy 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 31-32 (1983); Carol A.

Colabrese, Comment, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1087, 1092 (1982).
20. Consider, for example, the Missouri state supreme court majority opinion in Cruzan v.

Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990):
It is tempting to equate the state's interest in the preservation of life with some measure
of quality of life ....But the state's interest is not in quality of life ....Were quality of
life at issue, persons with all manner of handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate
their lives.
760 S.W.2d at 420. See also De Grella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 702, 711, 717 (Ky. 1993);
Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 761 (Md. 1993); Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1276

(Mass.), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 1512 (1992); In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 73
(Wis. 1992); Marzen, supra note 10 in particular, see sources cited infra notes 26-30 and
accompanying text; Peter J. Riga, Euthanasia, The Right to Die and Privacy: Observations
on Some Recent Cases, 11 LINCOLN L. REV. 109, 136-140 (1980); Christopher Supernor,
Note, Ignoring an Incompetent Person's Constitutional Right to Forgo Life-Sustaining
Treatment - Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209,
210 (1991).
21. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 346 (1986).
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logical point of view we are committed to accepting certain other practices as
well, since there are no good reasons for not going on to accept the additional
practices once we have taken the all-important first step. But, the argument
continues, the additional practices are plainly unacceptable; therefore, the
first step had better not be taken."2 2 The psychological form of the "slippery
slope" argument provides that "once certain practices are accepted, people
shall in fact go on to accept other more questionable practices."23 Thus, the
psychological form of the argument "is simply a claim about what people will
do and not a claim about what they are logically committed to."2 4n "[T]his form
of the argument says that if we start off by killing people to put them out of
extreme agony, we shall infact end up killing them for other reasons, regardless of logic and nice distinctions. Therefore, if we want to avoid the latter,
25
we had better avoid the former.
In practice, the variants of the "slippery-slope" are often fused together,
and may be accompanied by appeal to the emotions. The insidiousness of the
"slippery-slope" argument is apparent in Bishop Sullivan's condemnation of
euthanasia:
The 'wedge principle' means that an act which, if raised to a general
line of conduct would injure humanity, is wrong even in an individual
case....
This principle of the wedge may be applied to euthanasia, both voluntary euthanasia and compulsory euthanasia. Here for the sake of argument
it will be presumed that the suffering patient wishes euthanasia and that
no evil effects will result to his friends or the common good from the
single act of administering the euthanasia to him. Nevertheless, euthanasia must not be administered, for to permit in a single instance the direct
killing of an innocent person, would be to admit a most dangerous wedge
that might eventually put all life in a precarious condition. Once a man is
permitted on his own authority to kill an innocent person directly, there
is no way of stopping the advancement of that wedge. There exists no
longer any rational grounds for saying that the wedge can advance so far
and no farther. Once the exception has been admitted it is too late; hence
the grave reason why no exception may be allowed. That is why euthanasia under any circumstances must be condemned. ...
If voluntary euthanasia were legalized, there is good reason to believe
that at a later date another bill for compulsory euthanasia would be legalized. Once the respect for human life is so low that an innocent person
may be killed directly even at his own request, compulsory euthanasia will
22. James Rachels, Euthanasia, in MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 28, 58-59 (Tom Regan
ed., 1980).
23. Id. at 59.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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necessarily be very near. This could lead easily to killing all incurable
charity patients, the aged who are a public care, wounded soldiers, capetc.
tured enemy soldiers, all deformed children, the mentally afflicted,
26
Before long the danger would be at the door of every citizen.
Similarly, Grisez has no difficulty in linking voluntary euthanasia with
the horrors of Nazi genocide:
If liberal ideology and the implications of consequentialism are considered together, it becomes clear that no legalization of euthanasia can
stop at voluntary euthanasia, or even at the nonvoluntary euthanasia of
defective infants. The hesitation of Glanville Williams about the anxiety
of those who feel insanity coming on and about the shocking aspects of the
idea of disposing of the elderly is hardly likely to block the juggernaut of
the pro-death movement.
The final solution in the United States and other western societies will
be unlike the final solution in Nazi Germany in its details, but not unlike
it in its horror. And I fear that some who now live will experience this
final solution. They will live to see the day they will be killed."
Variations of the "slippery-slope" argument as applied to suicide and euthanasia are abundant.2 8 Beauchamp has argued, for example, that at least
from the perspective of rule utilitarianism, the wedge argument against euthanasia should be taken seriously. Accordingly, although a "restricted-activeeuthanasia rule would have some utility value" since some intense and uncontrollable suffering would be eliminated, "it may not have the highest utility
value in the structure of our present code or in any imaginable code which
could be made current, and therefore may not be a component in the ideal code
for our society .... For the disutility of introducing legitimate killing into

26. JOSEPH V. SULLIVAN, THE MORALITY OF MERCY KILLING 54-56 (1950).
27. Germain Grisez, Suicide and Euthanasia, in DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA, 742,
810-11. (DENNIS J.HORAN & DAVID MALL EDS., 1977). Grisez continues:
They will be killed, but not on the authority of a secret, dictatorial decree. They will be
killed to vindicate their right to die. This right will be discovered in one or several
amendments to the United States Constitution, or perhaps discerned by the sharp insight
of some Justice in the penumbra of the right to life. Or, perhaps, they will be killed by
the fiat of the Supreme Court, which in disregard of every legal precedent will declare
that they are not persons and that people like them never have been persons in the whole
sense. Or perhaps, they will be killed both to protect their rights and because they are
not persons with rights to protect.
They will be killed, but not with poison gas in a shower room; their bodies will be
disposed of, but not in incinerators. Technological process surely will find a better, a
more efficient, a less ugly way to do the job - a way which will not cause air pollution.
How, then, will they be killed? Nobody can forecast the technical details. But one thing
is certain. They will be killed with "dignity."
Id. at 811.
28. See also J. Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia, in INTERVENTION AND
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one's moral code (in the form of active euthanasia rules) may, in the long run,
outweigh the utility of doing so, as a result of the eroding effect such a relaxation would have on rules in the code which demand respect for human life."'2 9
Beauchamp then continues down a now-familiar path:
If, for example, rules permitting active killing were introduced, it is
not implausible to suppose that destroying defective newborns (a form of
involuntary euthanasia) would become an accepted and common practice,
that as population increases occur the aged will be even more neglectable
and neglected than they now are, that capital punishment for a wide variety of crimes would be increasingly tempting, that some doctors would
have appreciably reduced fears of actively injecting fatal doses whenever
it seemed to them propitious to do so .... A hundred such possible
consequences might easily be imagined. But these few are sufficient to
make the larger point that such rules permitting killing could lead to a
general reduction of respect for human life.3 0

At bottom, "slippery-slope" objections to the legalization of voluntary
active euthanasia advance the claim that if society were to permit a humane
form of voluntary active euthanasia, then inhumane forms of involuntary
euthanasia will follow, or, at least, that a general undesirable reduction in
society's respect for human life will occur. The logical interpretation of the
argument," in all the forms in which it has been leveled against legalized
voluntary euthanasia, is a dismal failure. If one explicity restricts one's advocacy to voluntary euthanasia, then one can hardly be vulnerable to the
charge that one's advocated position logically entails involuntary euthanasia
or the Nazi programs of non-euthanasian murders."'" The reductio form of the
argument is tantamount to the assertion that "once you allow euthanasia for
the patient in terrible agony, you are logically committed to approving of
euthanasia in other cases as well. ' 32 Indeed, Sullivan claims that "[o]nce a
man is permitted on his own authority to kill an innocent person directly, there
is no way of stopping the advancement of that wedge. There exists no longer
any rational grounds for saying that the wedge can advance so far and no
further."3 3 But this is patently false. There are rational and morally relevant
REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 114 (RONALD MANSON ED., 1979); Yale

Kamisar, Some Nonreligious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN.

L.

REV. 969 (1958); Riga, supra note 20.
29. Tom L. Beauchamp, A Reply to Rachels on Active and PassiveEuthanasia, in ETHICAL

ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING

246, 253 (TOM L.

BEAUCHAMP & SEYMOUR PERLIN EDS.,

1978).
30. Id.
31. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 346.
32. Rachels, supra note 22, at 59.
33. Sullivan, supra note 26, at 55.
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grounds for distinguishing between the patient in agony who voluntarily seeks
death and other cases, such as Sullivan's catalogue of "charity patients,"
''wounded soldiers," and "deformed children," who presumably do not wish
to die. The line of demarcation can readily be drawn by the voluntariness of
the act. In the first instance, the individual requests death, while in the second, the persons involved do not. The gulf between humanely assisting a
competent and willing patient to effect his own death and murdering nonconsenting persons under the slogan of "euthanasia" is too wide to glaze over.
Society is not logically committed to sanctioning involuntary euthanasia once
it permits voluntary active euthanasia. Nor does it follow that society must
lose respect for human life once it begins to respect the sanctity of individual
choice. The legalization of voluntary active euthanasia simply does not entail the horrors its opponents envision. As such, the logical variant of the
"slippery-slope" fails, and cannot be used to justify universal proscriptions of
self-willed death.
The psychological interpretation of the "slippery-slope" argument is perhaps more plausible, and exists as part of a "falling dominoes" scenario:
To be sure, voluntary euthanasia does not logically entail involuntary euthanasia, but rather the dominoes are so arranged that once a particular
legislature legalizes voluntary euthanasia, then inevitably political pressures will mount for the legalization of nonvoluntary euthanasia, which
will in due time be legalized, softening up public opinion for involuntary
34
euthanasia, encouraging politicians to move in that direction, and so on.
As Feinberg points out, [w]hether the argument is a good one depends on
how the dominoes are in fact placed, and that is a complicated empirical
question about which no one can pronounce with dogmatic confidence.
But if there is a powerful independent moral case for the legalization of
voluntary euthanasia, one would think that the burden would be on its
opponents to show that the dominoes are lined up in order, and that the fall
of those that are likely to topple would be a bad thing.3
The simple recognition that life is not always worth living generates a
'powerful independent moral case" for the recognition of the constitutional
right to suicide and for the type of voluntary active euthanasia that this right
would engender. Yet opponents of the right to suicide have not met the burden of showing that disasterous effects will ensue from the rights' adoption.
There is a good amount of historical and anthropological evidence to
support the claim that the approval of killing in one context does not necessarily lead to killing in different contexts of a culture. The infanticide of
deformed offspring was widely accepted in ancient Athens and required by
34. Feinberg, supra note 21, at 346.
35. Id. at 346-47.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss1/3

8

Neeley: The Constitutional Right To Suicide

Summer, 1994]

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To SUICIDE

law in Sparta. Yet the practice of infanticide "is not a sign that [the Greeks]
placed little value on human life. They were not a murderous people, and they
took a stern view of some other types of killing. ' 36 The early Christians accepted homicide in times of war, capital punishment, or out of obedience to
God, and yet rejected it under other circumstances. 7 In China, Confucian
ethics permitted voluntary death in the case of hopeless disease, and the
great Eastern religions, including Shintoism and Buddhism, followed a similar path 38 _ in each instance, without apparent disruption to the moral fabric
of society. Among Eskimo societies, the killing of infants and the aged was
widely practiced as a measure to avoid depletion of the food supply, and yet
murder was virtually unheard of. 31 Within contemporary Western society,
killing is permitted in numerous circumstances: war, capital punishment,
heroic self-sacrifice, and self-defense. Yet there is no evidence that such
exceptions to the repulsion for killing have presented dangerous inroads leading to a general devaluation of human life.
Williams has referred to the "slippery-slope" as the "trump card of the
traditionalist, because no proposal for reform, however strong the arguments
in favour, is immune from the wedge objection. In fact, the stronger the arguments in favour of a reform, the more likely it is that the traditionalist will
take the wedge objection-it is then the only one he has."40 One of the implications of this type of argument is that "you must resist every proposal, however admirable in itself, because otherwise you will never be able to draw the
line."" Yet there is strong evidence in support of the claim that society can
establish a line of distinction along moral grounds and to advance no further
with it.
Proponents of the "slippery-slope" objection to suicide and euthanasia
frequently make reference to the "final solution" of Germany's Third Reich,
suggesting that the horrors of genocide begin with the legitimization of euthanasia. The psychological impact of the accusation is difficult to disregard.
Yet as Williams observes, the specter of the Holocaust could be brought to
bear with equal psychological force against altering the taboo proscribing
sterilization: "When proposals are made for promoting voluntary sterilization
on eugenic and other grounds, they are immediately condemned by most

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Rachels, supra note 22, at 52.
§ 26 (George E. McCracken trans., 1957).
Rachels, supra note 22, at 35.
Id. at 60.
Glanville Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation - A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. REV.
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD book I,

1, 9 (1959).
41. Id. at 10.
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people as the thin edge of a wedge leading to involuntary sterilization; and
then they point to the practices of the Nazis. '42 But the history of sterilization
programs in the United States suggests quite the contrary, and "a more persuasive argument pointing in the other direction can easily be found. ' 43 At the
beginning of the century, a number of sterilization laws were attempted in the
United States in response to mounting interest in eugenics. 44 In the 1927
decision of Buck v. Bell,45 the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia law which

provided that whenever the superintendent of a state institution considered it
in the best interest of a patient and society, patients afflicted with hereditary
forms of insanity and imbecility could be considered for sterilization: "We
have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices .... After
a period of widespread employment of eugenic sterilization practices, divided
popular opinion and a general decline of interest in eugenics caused the pendulum to swing in the opposite direction.47 Sterilization found respect in a few
states as a branch of social medicine, but most jurisdictions with sterilization
laws never put them into serious effect.48 In 1942, the Supreme Court decided
Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 9 concluding in a different context that the right to
procreate was a fundamental right under the Constitution. The momentum for
positive eugenics continued to decline as the medical community became
increasingly aware of the scientific impracticability of substantially improving the human species through this means.50 At present, "[s]ome twenty-seven
states still have so-called involuntary sterilization laws. Yet medical, legal,
and public attitudes toward sterilizing the mentally deficient have undergone
a radical change. Today no responsible person advocates the compulsory sterilization of the mentally incompetent."'" In synopsis:

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 82 (1970).

45. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
46. Id. at 207.
47. Williams notes that some of the curtailment in sterilization practices may have been
due to uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of the laws in question, "but the most
important factors are cessation of interest and divided public opinion." WILLIAMS, supra note
44, at 83.
48. Id.
49. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
50. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 84.
51. RONALD MUNSON, INTERVENTION AND REFLECTION: BASIC ISSUES IN MEDICAL ETHICS

449 (Ronald Munson ed., 2d ed. 1983).
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The American experience is of great interest because it shows how remote
from reality in a democratic community is the fear - frequently voiced
by Americans themselves - that voluntary sterilization may be the "thin
edge of the wedge," leading to a large-scale violation of human rights as
happened in Nazi Germany. In fact, the American experience is the precise opposite - starting with compulsory sterilization, administrative
practice has come to put the operation on a voluntary footing.52
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT
If suicide were to become a constitutional right, then - under certain
circumstances - the doctrine of substituted judgment could conceivably
apply to allow a guardian ad litem to assert this right on behalf of comatose
or otherwise incompetent patients. The question arises whether this type of
nonvoluntary euthanasia53 could present a wedge which would ultimately lead
to involuntary euthanasia. It is sufficient to respond that there remains a tremendous difference between this variety of nonvoluntary euthanasia and
involuntary euthanasia. The doctrine of substituted judgment exists so that
an individual will not lose his right of autonomy simply because he has lost
the ability to directly exercise that right.54 In cases allowing a guardian to

52. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 90-91. It is, of course, conceivable that a proponent of the
wedge objection might seek to dismiss anthropological and historical evidence contrary to his
position as "irrelevant." Accordingly, the argument would suggest that the behavior exhibited
by different cultures while permitting killing under certain contexts does not serve as an
adequate predictor of how our society would react to the legalization of suicide and euthanasia.
A host of growing public concerns such as the cost and accessibility of health care and the
increasing number of elderly persons within the society may serve to separate our culture
from others regarding the foreseeable misuse of the right to suicide.
It is sufficient to respond to such charges that if anthropological and historical evidence
is not considered relevant to the discussion of suicide and euthanasia, then proponents of the
wedge objection will lose the major weapon of their arsenal: the fear that the legalization of
euthanasia will lead to atrocities rivaling Nazi genocide. Either historical and anthropological
evidence is allowable within the debate or it is not. If it is allowable, then relevant evidence
can be produced on both sides of the debate. If such evidence is not allowable because it is
culturally disparate and thereby "irrelevant," then the wedge objection loses much of its vitality.
Indeed, one might suggest under the latter case that simply because something happened once
does not mean that it would ever happen again. In short, there are few rights or liberties
which cannot become engines of abuse. Any potential for abuse of the right to suicide calls
for caution in its implementation and exercise, not for rejection of the right.
53. Rachels provides that "[n]onvoluntary euthanasia occurs when the patient is unable to
form a judgment or voice a wish in the matter and, therefore expresses no desire whatever."
Rachels, supra note 22, at 31. He thereupon recites two hypothetical patients as examples of
recipients of nonvoluntary euthanasia, one who is "senile and only semiconscious," the other
who is "permanently comatose." Id.
54. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass.
1977).
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decline medical intervention on behalf of incompetent patients, the courts
have permitted substituted judgment as a humane measure to effect the probable wishes of the patient under the circumstances as calculated by existing
evidence. 55 In this respect, passive nonvoluntary euthanasia is already firmly
established within the law. Moreover, because the court endeavors to follow
whatever course of action the incompetent patient would have chosen had he
not been incapacitatied, instances of nonvoluntary euthanasia performed under the doctrine of substituted judgment are actually a species of voluntary
euthanasia. If a situation calling for active nonvoluntary euthanasia should
present itself, the presiding court would similarly be guided by the humanitarian credo of seeking to effect the will and best interests of the patient. The
laudable aims of respecting individual choice (even within a scenario involving substituted judgment) 6 and seeking the best interests of the individual are
diametrically opposed to schemes advocating involuntary euthanasia.
Moreover, the courts have undertaken every possible precaution to ensure that the doctrine of substituted judgment will not be abused. Ever since
the seminal decision of In re Quinlan57 in 1976, courts utilizing the doctrine
of substituted judgment within right-to-die scenarios have applied one of five
tests or procedures specifically designed to safeguard the rights of incompetents:58 (1) substituted judgment based upon clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's wishes, (2) substituted judgment where the family's best assessment of the patient's desires is respected, (3) a combination of (1) and (2)
above, (4) a best interests/pure objective standard based upon such considerations as "a patient's relief from suffering, his prognosis and possibility of
recovery, and the quality and extent of his life on the life-sustaining treatment"59 as well as "the satisfaction of present desires, the opportunities for
future satisfactions, and the possibility of developing or regaining the capacity
for self-determination" 60 and (5) a limited objective standard based upon
"trustworthy" 61 evidence of the patient's wishes" where it is clear that the

55. E.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Torres, 357 N.W.3d 332
(Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
56. The very purpose of the doctrine of substituted judgment is to protect the individual's
right of choice even under circumstances in which she cannot exercise that right.
57. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
58. Anne Marie Gaudin, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: To Die or
Not to Die: That is the Question - But Who Decides? 51 LA. L. REV. 1307, 1328 (1991).
59. Id. at 1335 (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1987) and In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985)).
60. Rasmussen, 741 P.2d at 689.
61. Gaudin, supra note 58, at 1337 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1232).
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burdens of life continued by treatment outweigh the benefits of life."62 In all
cases, the goal of substituted judgment "is not to do what most people would
do, or what the court believes is the wise thing to do, but rather what this
particular individual would do if she were competent and understood all the
63
circumstances.
THE DISENFRANCHISED
Proponents of the "slippery slope" objection have also charged that those
who are already disvalued by society - the aged, infirm and other groups
traditionally victimized by discrimination will be particularly susceptible to
that ever-advancing and tenuous edge of involuntary euthanasia. It has similarly been touted that the legalization of any form of active euthanasia will
impart a societal message inherently disrespectful of life which will weigh
especially hard upon the disadvantaged. But it must be remembered that the
sick and dying are also a discrete and insular 64 group that is typically disvalued
by society, and that it would be particularly unfair to deny such persons the
right to control the course of their own destiny, and force them to suffer needlessly in order to placate society's abstract concern for the sanctity of life.
Furthermore, interpreting the "messages" implicitly communicated by the
legalization of voluntary active euthanasia is a speculative undertaking with
which no one can speak ex cathedra. It might just as well be argued that respect for the wishes of the seriously ill is a necessary step towards respect for
all persons. Finally, this twist of the "slippery slope" argument neglects to
consider the importance of all of the other forces at work in our culture. It is
not the occasional euthanatic killing motivated by compassion that negatively
affects social relations and the quality of life in America, but the thousands
of discompassionate killings that occur every day perpetrated by individuals
with little or no ties to the social and moral community.
The manifold arguments against suicide and euthanasia contrast with the
simple humanitarian arguments for their acceptance.65 When death becomes

62. Id.
63. In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Wash. 1984).

64. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 34 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (J. Stone).
65. WILLIAMS, supra note 44, at 316. Similarly, Rachel states:
The single most powerful argument in support of euthanasia is the argument from mercy.
It is also an exceptionally simple argument, at least in its main idea, which makes one
uncomplicated point. Terminal patients sometimes suffer pain so horrible that it is beyond
the comprehension of those who have not actually experienced it.... The argument
from mercy says: Euthanasia is justified because it provides an end to that.
Rachels, supra note 22, at 40.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 3

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:1

the only respite from torment, it is both humane and rational to allow the individual to terminate his own existence. When the patient is unable to carry
out his wishes, it is morally acceptable to assist the individual to achieve a
swift and easy passage. Conversely, it is inhumane to keep a person alive
against his will and best interests in order to satisfy abstract claims made by
the state, or in order to force grudging allegiance to an eschatology which the
individual may not accept. Yet as Williams observes with customary eloquence, behind the simple humanitarianism of the affirmative argument there
lies a profound question of philosophy:
It is good that men should feel a horror of taking human life, but in a
rational judgment the quality of the life must be considered. The absolute
interdiction of suicide and euthanasia involves the impossible assertion
that every life, no matter what its quality or circumstances, is worth living and obligatory to be lived. This assertion of the value of mere existence, in the absence of all the activities that give meaning to life, and in
the face of the disintegration of personality that so often follows from
prolonged agony, will not stand scrutiny. On any rationally acceptable
philosophy there is no ethical value in
living any sort of life: the only life
66
that is worth living is the good life.
The recognition that life is not always worth living gives rise to an independent moral argument for the legalization of suicide and euthanasia. The
proposed right to suicide advances this claim and stems from the
Constitution's commitment to personal autonomy - the view that the individual should have unfettered liberty over his own life and person insofar as
the exercise of such liberty does not harm others. As such, the right to suicide
is born of respect for individual choice and could never be used to sanction
involuntary euthanasia. 67 Proponents of the "wedge" objection cannot successfully demonstrate that undesirable effects will follow the right's adoption.
It is particularly unobvious that the legalization of suicide and euthanasia will
66. WILLIAMS, supra note 44,
quotation from Sidney Hook:

at 316-17. Williams continues this line of reasoning with a

We may define the good life differently, but no matter what our conception of the good
life is, it presupposes a physical basis - a certain indispensable minimum of physical
and social well-being - necessary for even a limited realization of that good life. Where
that minimum is failing together with all rational probability of attaining it, to avoid a
life at its best can be only vegetative and at its worst run the entire gamut of degradation
and obloquy, what high-minded person would refuse the call of the poet "mourir entre
les bras du sommeil"? We must recognize no categorical imperative "to live," but "to
live well."

Id. at 317 (quoting The Ethics of Suicide, 37 INT'L J. ETHICS 173, 186 (1927)).
67. It would be preposterous to claim that the Constitution's protection of the abortion
right could one day be used to sanction mandatory involuntary abortion. It should be
considered equally absurd to argue that the constitutional right to suicide could ultimately
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lead to a disvaluation of human life. Indeed, it is equally tenable to postulate
that a refusal to recognize the right to suicide will actually pose a greater threat
to the sanctity of human life because such a stance would promote disregard
for the quality and meaning of life. Universal proscriptions of self-willed
death run afoul of respect for individual choice and accommodate callous
indifference towards the suffering of others. Forcing an individual to remain
alive against his own considered rational decree out of blind allegiance to archaic legal and social taboos is antithetical to human dignity, as it effectively
treats the person as a means to advance society's ends. In this respect, it is
simple enough to subvert the "wedge" objection by constructing an "antiwedge" argument along similar lines - for once society fails to recognize the
importance of self-sovereignty, and begins to ignore those critical aspects of
existence which give life its meaning, then there is little to prevent an erosion
of personal rights which would ultimately culminate in the loss of all freedom.
EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS:
TESTING THE "SLIPPERY-SLOPE"
Article 293 of the Dutch Penal Code states that "he who robs another of
life at his express and serious wish, is punished with a prison sentence of at
most twelve years ....,,6" The punishment for mercy killing imposed by
Article 293 is less severe than the punishment for murder due to the request
of the patient.

69

The first court decision in which a physician was convicted but not sentenced under Article 293 occurred in 1950.'0 But it was not until 1971 that the
Dutch actually began to move toward the legalization of voluntary active euthanasia. 7 The movement was ignited when a physician, Dr. Geertruida
72
Postma, injected her terminally ill mother with a lethal dose of morphine.
When the physician was brought to trial, the court acknowledged that it was
not unusual for the "average physician in the Netherlands" to allocate suffilead to involuntary euthanasia.
68. Marian H. N. Driesse et al., Euthanasia and the Law of the Netherlands, 3 ISSUES IN
L. & MED. 385, 386 (Walter Lagerway trans. 1988).
69. Deborah A. Wainey, Active Voluntary Euthanasia: The Ultimate Act of Care for the
Dying, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645, 663 (1989) (citing Driesse, supra note 68, at 386).
70. Id. at 654.

71. The definition of euthanasia widely accepted in the Netherlands is: "the active

termination of a patient's life at his or her request, by a physician." Maurice A. M. de
Wachter, Euthanasiain the Netherlands, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. - Apr. 1992, at 23.
72. See Judgment of Feb. 21, 1973, Rb. [district court] Leeuwarden, 1973 Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie [NJ], No. 183 (Neth.), translated in 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 439 (Walter
Lagerway trans., 1988).
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cient medication to alleviate the unbearable suffering of an incurably ill patient, even if the prescribed course of pain alleviation would shorten the
patient's life.73 The court adopted the prevailing medical standard as a guide.
It further held that although the required conditions for a course of alleviation74 were present, Postma had erred by circumventing this course and administering "a lethal dose all at once."75 The doctor was given a conditional
sentence of one week along with a probationary period of one year.
The Postma decision brought the principle of double effect to the critical foreground in Holland. The Dutch medical community condoned the administration of drugs to relieve suffering even if the result would be to shorten
the patient's life. Yet it was forbidden to manipulate dosages with the intent
to hasten or cause death. The pivotal issue, therefore, seems to be the specific
intent of the actor and not the consequences.76 If Postma had dispensed her
mother's medication over a period of time in ostensible effort to relieve her
suffering, instead of utilizing an immediately fatal injection, her actions
would not have been punished. This seems to imply that an action which is
impermissible when performed outright, can be permissibly carried out in
increments.7 7 This dichotomy renders the case particularly difficult to decipher. Was the court merely sanctioning the principle of double effect or rather
promulgating specifications under which a physician could avoid the penalties of Article 293? The court's emphasis on the fact that Postma had circumvented the course of alleviation suggests that it is legally permissible for a
physician to terminate a patient's suffering as long as she does not resort to
78
lethal means without first pursuing the course of alleviation.
The Postma decision essentially afforded a terminally ill patient with unbearable suffering the right to request and receive assistance-in-dying from
73. Id. at 439.
74. The course of alleviation is considered appropriate when the following five conditions
are present:
A. [When] it concerns a patient who is incurable because of illness or accident ... or
who must be regarded as incurably ill from a medical standpoint;
B. subjectively, his physical or spiritual suffering is unbearable or serious to the patient;
C. the patient has indicated in writing, it could even be beforehand, that he desires to
terminate his life, in any case that he wants to be delivered from his suffering;
D. according to medical opinion the dying phase has begun for the patient or is
indicated; and
E. action is taken by the doctor, that is, the attending physician or medical specialist, or
in consultation with that physician.

Id.
75. Id. at 442.
76. Wainey, supra note 69, at 656.

77. Id.
78. Id.
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his attending physician.79 A 1981 ruling expanded this right to cover nonterminal patients afflicted with continuous, unbearable physical and spiritual
suffering.8 0 In 1983, this standard was relaxed to require only continuous
suffering without "reference to suffering being unbearable as an independent
condition."'"
The Dutch courts continue to pave the way toward making voluntary active euthanasia a reality in the Netherlands. 81 Yet it is clearly the medical profession which is charged with the primary responsibility of deciding whether
to proceed with the practice of euthanasia, since the courts have placed such
strong emphasis upon the standards of prevailing medical practice. The obvious divergence between case law and statutory law has left the Dutch government, medical profession, and Public Prosecutor with little certain ground,
and has caused concern among opponents of euthanasia that this practice has
83
begun to stretch into the realm of involuntary euthanasia.
In 1982, the Queen of Holland created a State Commission on Euthanasia in an effort to determine "the future policy of the government in the matter of euthanasia ...in particular with respect to legislation and the application of law."' 84 In 1985, that Commission issued a report advising the Queen
that Article 293 should be revised to legalize voluntary euthanasia, and proposed statutory reform that would allow a physician to avoid punishment
under Article 293 provided that the euthanasia be performed at the request of
the patient, and in accordance with the guidelines outlined by the Commission. 85 A bill was accordingly presented to Parliament in response to the
Commission's report. 86 The government responded to this bill by issuing its
own, more conservative Trial Proposal in 1986.87 Both bills were in turn
introduced to the Council of State - the highest advisory organ of the Dutch
government - for review. The Council of State responded by advising the
government to refrain from modifying Article 293 until the corpus of case law

79. Id.
80. Id. at 656-58 (citing Driesse, supra note 68, at 394).
81. Driesse, supra note 68, at 394.
82. Wainey, supra note 69, at 661.
83. Id.
84. Driesse, supra note 68, at 394-95.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. H.R.G. Ferber, De wederwaardigheden van artikel 293 vanhet Wetboek van Strafrecht
vanaf 1981 tot heden [The Vicissitudes of article 293 of the Penal Code from 1981 to the
Present], in EUTHANASIE KNELPUNTEN IN EEN DiscussIE [EUTHANASIA: BOTTLENECKS IN A
DISCUSSION] 54 (G. A. Van Der Wal ed., 1987), translated in 3 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 455

(Walter Lagerway trans., 1988).
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could develop further. This recommendation was in direct conflict with the
Commission's report which had concluded that statutory reform was needed
because it would take years to achieve clarity in the law if the issue remained
solely within the purview of the courts.88
Opponents of legalized voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands criticized the courts for having vested such responsibility in the medical community when there was no real consensus on the permissibility of euthanasia.
Thus, in 1987, the Royal Netherlands Society for the Promotion of Medicine,
and the Recovery Interest Society for Nurses and Nursing Aides issued ajoint
declaration establishing practical guidelines for health care professionals
involved in euthanasia decisions.8 9 While the organizations did not necessarily condone euthanasia, they were able to provide some semblance of "official" guidance to those physicians who elect to perform euthanasia, and to the
nursing staff who might assist. 90
Physicians in Holland are not required to report crimes against lifef 1 As
such, euthanasia killings involving physicians are likely to go unnoticed unless the doctor reports the incident or is turned in to the prosecutor by others.
Only a handful of such cases are reported. 92 Commentary addressing the
issues of physician aid-in-dying often points to the Netherlands as a case
study. The literature has "drawn somewhat indiscriminately on the Dutch
experience to support arguments both for and against physician assisted suicide and, especially, euthanasia." 9 3 Quite often, reports of alleged abuse are
cited as definitive illustrations of the "slippery slope" effect. 94 Thus, the
January, 1989 Hastings Center Report Special Supplement on euthanasia
brandished an article by Richard Fenigsen, a Dutch cardiologist that was
scathingly critical of both the law and practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands.9 5 Fenigsen claimed that involuntary euthanasia was widely accepted
and openly supported in his country, and that "[t]hose who contend that it is
possible to accept and practice 'voluntary' euthanasia and not allow involun88. Wainey, supra note 69, at 662.
89. P. Schepens, Euthanasia: Our Own Future?, 3

ISSUES IN L. & MED. 371, 377-78
(1988).
90. Wainey, supra note 69, at 663.
91. Id. at 664.
92. Id.
93. de Wachter, supra note 71, at 23.
94. See Daniel Callahan When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar. - Apr. 1992, at 52, 54; Alexander Morgan Capron, Euthanasia in the Netherlands:
American Observations, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. - Apr. 1992, at 30, 32; Richard
Fenigsen, Euthanasiain the Netherlands, 6 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 229, 243 (1990).
95. Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, HASTING CENTER REP.,
Jan. - Feb. 1989, at 22.
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tary [euthanasia] totally disregard the Dutch reality."9 6 In stark contrast, a
following article by Henk Ritger, director of the Dutch Health Council, answered that there was simply no evidence of the practice of involuntary euthanasia. 97 Furthermore, in a letter to the Report's editors the following
November, a large and prestigious assembly of Holland's leading experts in
law, medicine and ethics verified that Ritger's assessment of the situation was
quite correct and that Fenigsen's commentary was "completely misplaced." 98
Most recently, Carlos F. Gomez 99 and John Keown10 0 have drawn upon
Fenigsen's claim to assert evidence of abuse in the Netherlands. In response
to Gomez and Keown, Margaret Pabst Battin has critically warned that the
various allegations of abuse may well be fatally defective. Accordingly,
"[s]uch works tend to conflate two issues: whether abuse is actually occurring,
and whether there are adequate protections against abuse; within the former
category they also fail to distinguish between procedural abuse (e.g., not following the guidelines) and substantive abuse (killing patients against their
will)."10'

In the autumn of 199 1, the results of two empirical studies on euthanasia in the Netherlands were released. Van der Wal, van Eijk, Leenen, and
Spreeuwenberg reported the results of an "exploratory, descriptive, retrospective study of morbidity, age and sex of patients whose family doctors helped
them to die," 102 while the more influential Committee on the Study of Medical Practice concerning Euthanasia (the Remmelink Committee) sought to investigate "all situations in which physicians make decisions that aim (also) at
ending suffering by hastening the end of the patient's life or in which the
probability of a hastening of the end of life must be taken into account."° 3
96. Id. at 26.
97. Henk Ritger, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Fact from Fiction,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan. - Feb. 1989, at 31.
98. G.M. Aartsen, et al., Letter to the Editor HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov. - Dec. 1989, at
47, 48.
99. Carlos F. Gomez, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991).
100. John Keown, On Regulating Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. - Apr. 1992,
at 39.
101. Margaret Pabst Battin, Assisted Suicide: Can We Learn from Germany?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar. - Apr. 1992, at 44, 51 n.2.
102. G. van der Wal et al., Euthanaise en hulp bij zelfdoding door artsen in de thuissituatie
[Euthanasiaand MedicallyAssisted Suicide in the Home Situation], NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR GENEESKUNDE, 1593 (1991), cited in Henk A.M.J. ten Have & Jos V.M. Welie,
Euthanasia:Normal Medical Practice?,HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar. - Apr. 1992, at 34.
103. COMMISSIE ONDERZOCK MEDISCHE PRACTIJK INZAKE EUTHANASIE, MEDISCHE
BESLISSINGEN ROND HET LEVENSEINDE MEDICAL [DECISIONS CONCERNING THE END OF LIFE],

(1991), cited in ten Have, supra note 102.
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It is accordingly estimated that 130,000 people die each year in the Netherlands. In 49,000 of these deaths "physicians have to decide whether to continue life support, withhold treatment, increase the dose of morphine to provide adequate pain relief, even at a potentially lethal level, assist in suicide,
or actually kill the patient."104
It is further estimated that assisted suicide is "relatively uncommon" and
occurs only 400 times a year. 0 5 Euthanasia, denoting "any action that intentionally ends the life of someone else, on the request of that person," occurs
2,300 times a year (five percent of the 49,000 deaths involving physician discretion).106 Since 9,000 patients request euthanasia each year, it would appear
that physicians grant such wishes less than half of the time. 0 7 Moreover,
euthanasia has the highest incidence among family physicians and general
practioners, whereas physicians in nursing homes seldom perform euthanasia. 108
Critics have alleged, however, that many physicians do not classify their
actions as euthanasia, even when those actions fall strictly under the definition employed by the studies.0 9 Consequently, the figure of 2,300 may not accurately portray the number of euthanatic killings as "other forms of intentional hastening of death are common practice in the Netherlands, yet fully
escape professional, judicial, and social scrutiny." 0
There may also be as many as 1,000 patients annually whose demise is
caused or hastened by physicians despite the absence of any specific request
on the part of the patient."' This figure encompasses patients who suffer
severely and are no longer competent to make treatment decisions. The
Remmelink Committee found that in forty-five percent of these nonvoluntary
euthanasia cases, the treatment of pain was no longer adequate to relieve
suffering." 2 However, the impossibility of effective pain management was
cited as the reason for euthanasia in only thirty percent of the cases. The
remaining seventy percent of nonvoluntary euthanasia decisions were rendered by physicians for reasons including "(1) low quality of life; (2) no prospect for improvement; (3) all forms of medical treatment had become futile;

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

ten Have, supra note 102.
Id. The authors do not define the term "assisted suicide".
Id.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
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(4) all treatment was withdrawn but the patient did not die; or (5) one should
not postpone death.""' 3 In one-third of the cases, the fact that the patient's
loved ones could no longer bear the situation played a role in the decision, and
that economic considerations, such as a
at least one respondent indicated
14
shortage of beds, played a role."
It is difficult to gauge what these figures actually mean. At least one report has charged that the Remmelink Committee swayed its findings in an
effort to accommodate a predetermined political bias." 5 The Committee allegedly sought to remove social anxiety regarding the practice of euthanasia,
and utilized "fallacious rhetoric" to emphasize that there is little cause for
concern. But it is just as likely that opponents of euthanasia skew their findings and employ emotionally charged language in earnest endeavor to show
that abuse is widespread. Statistics and emotional overtones are easily manipulated - by either side of the debate. Nevertheless, opponents of legalized
voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands have largely failed to address certain
salient questions: What is meant by physician abuse? Are doctors bending
the black letter of the law in order to comply with their patient's voluntary
request and best interests or are they actually putting people to death without
due concern for the patient's intent? Does the alleged abuse take the form of
nonvoluntary euthanasia or involuntary euthanasia? Would adequate procedural safeguards or even a clear understanding of the present state of the law
curtail the abuse alleged?
One certain fact regarding euthanasia in the Netherlands is that is takes
place within the context of an ambiguous legal framework. 1' 6 Despite various attempts by sundry organizations, no specific, comprehensive ethical or
legal framework has been constructed.' Hospitals have developed their own
standards, 118 and physicians effectively operate from a pending "rule of
thumb." Thus, while euthanasia is still technically illegal, 19 physicians who
adhere to certain conditions recognized by the courts and the 1985 State
Commission on Euthanasia generally escape criminal sanction. The necessary conditions involve:
(1) voluntariness: a persistent, conscious and free request by the patient;
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Stephen A. Newman, Euthanasia: Orchestrating "The Last Syllable Of... Time",
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 187 (1991).
117. Maurice A. M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316,
3319 (1989).
118. Newman, supra note 116, at 188.
119. de Wachter, supra note 71, at 23.
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(2) a hopeless situation: a state of the disease or illness that both physician
and patient consider to be beyond recovery; and (3) consultation of a
colleague: confirmation of the decision-making process whereby physi-2
cian and patient agree on the appropriateness of the euthanasia request. 1
Physicians, however, have no guidelines regarding nonvoluntary euthanasia. Although the issue has been summarily debated, "no case law has yet
developed nor has the medical profession laid down guidelines for practice." 121
In sum, it is presently impossible to extrapolate any standard from the
Dutch experience that could realistically serve to bar the recognition of the
constitutional right to suicide within the United States. Many factors differentiate the two political climes. While there are scant allegations of abuse
within the Dutch system, there is certainly no incontrovertible evidence of
substantive abuse. Whatever abuse, if any, that exists in the Netherlands
might well be halted altogether if there were clearer guidelines for health care
workers to follow. As it is, euthanasia remains illegal in Holland, yet it is not
always punished, while specific guidelines for the practice are effectively
contingent upon further case law development. It would stand to reason that
even the most earnest practitioner under such a system would be hesitant to
invite public and legal scrutiny. One cannot unerringly follow guidelines
when the guidelines are nonexistent or unclear.
Furthermore, a certain equitable and logical burden of proof ought to be
involved in any fair hearing on the merits of a proposal. As previously addressed, there exists a very powerful and convincing moral argument for the
legalization of voluntary active euthanasia. If opponents of euthanasia are
not, in turn, required to at least match this argument with an equal measure of
forensic weight, then the proposal will be effectively dismissed on a priori
grounds. No proposal for reform, however beneficent, can ever escape the
allegations of potential abuse. If the constitutional right to suicide is given a
fair and impartial hearing on the merits, then "slippery-slope" arguments
stemming from supposed abuse in the Netherlands will not prevail, if, however, the right to suicide is not given a fair hearing, then no discussion of
individual liberty will be left uncompromised.
THE BOTTOM LINE: SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The scope of the constitutional right to suicide is to protect the right of
the competent adult to terminate his own existence. The impact of the right
120. de Wachter, supra note 117, at 3316.
at 23.
121. de Wachter, supra note 71, at 24.
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will fall upon seriously ill patients who seek death but lack the wherewithal
to effect their own destruction. Judicial recognition of this right will not open
social floodgates to a wave of unwarranted suicides. 2 Individuals who want
to die and are capable of carrying out their wishes are not likely to be deterred
by the threat of criminal sanctions. Thus, incompetent or distraught persons
who would destroy themselves without sufficient cause or consideration will
not be affected by a change in the legal status of suicide. As a practical matter, therefore, broad proscriptions of suicide and (in particular) assisted suicide seem to deny access to self-imposed death to that specific class of persons who might actually benefit from existing life - terminal and seriously
ill patients.
If suicide were recognized as a fundamental human right under the Constitution, it would mean two things: (1) the state could not infringe this right
unless the proposed abridgment were necessary to advance some compelling
state interest, 23 and (2) the legislation in question would need to be narrowly
tailored so as to constitute the least restrictive means available to sustain the
state's compelling purpose. 24 The four state interests typically asserted as restrictions upon an individual's right to self-determination are: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, safeguarding the integrity of the medical
26
2
profession, and protecting innocent third parties. 1 Yet a thorough analysis 1
of the purported interests reveals that the states' real concern should be with
preserving the lives of those persons for whom the loss of life would be infelicitous and with preventing unnecessary harm to all relevant parties concerned. This statement of government interest takes into consideration the

122. Opponents of the constitutional right to suicide have suggested that judicial recognition
of the right will have disasterous consequences for society because "the Constitution would
not permit an absolute prohibition on any attempt to exercise an acknowledged constitutional
right. Marzen, supra note 10, at 101. The implication proposed is that once suicide becomes
a constitutional right, society will be impotent to prevent irrational acts of self-destruction by
minors, incompetents or the temporarily distraught. But it betrays a rather naive grasp of
constitutional law to suggest that the right to suicide would not permit regulatory safeguards.
The state may regulate within the sphere of fundamental liberties provided that such restrictions
satisfy the requirements of "strict scrutiny" analysis. If freedom of expression, for example,
may be circumscribed by reasonable limits designed to curtail its misuse, Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), there is no reason to believe that the same would not hold
true of the right to suicide.
123. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S.
621 (1969).
124. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
125. See cases and commentary supra note 16.
126. For a thorough analysis of the state interests involved in right-to-die scenarios see G.
Steven Neeley, PatientAutonomy and State Intervention: Reexamining the State's Purported
Interest, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 235 (1992).
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observation that life is not always worth living and that the state must not
ignore or disvalue the overriding concern of the patient in effecting a balancing of interests. It reflects the understanding that the "prevention of suicide"
is not an independent interest worthy of consideration but rather is subsumed
within the more general interest in the "preservation of life," 127 and further
recognizes that the integrity of the medical profession is not threatened by
allowing the autonomy rights of individuals to supersede institutional consid128
erations.
Legislation which broadly proscribes all deliberate acts of self-destruction - or aiding and abetting such acts - does not constitute the least restrictive means of advancing the state's compelling purpose. Recognition of the
constitutional right to suicide would accordingly herald the demise of criminal
sanctions which flatly condemn suicide or assisted suicide. It would not
mean, however, that the state could never impose justifiable constraints upon
the exercise of the right. It would mean only that the legislature would be
forced to draft narrowly tailored laws which advance the state's compelling
purpose without unnecessarily stifling the fundamental liberty of thoroughgoing self-determination. The breadth of legislative abridgment of the right
would be held in check by the "less drastic means" test lz9 afforded to fundamental liberties under "strict scrutiny" analysis. The upshot of judicial recognition of the right to suicide would be the creation of a legal atmosphere in
which the state could still promote legislation geared toward the protection of
life - such as enactments seeking to protect minors or incompetents from
unwarranted acts of self-destruction - but in which no competent adult could
be forced to remain alive against his will and best interests. As a positive
right, rather than simply a negative claim, the right to suicide could be used
to solicit the assistance of others in order to make death as painless and dignified as possible. But precisely because the right to suicide stems from the
Constitutions's core commitment to personal autonomy, it would be conceptually antithetical to the usurpation of self-sovereignty and could never be
used to sanction involuntary euthanasia.

127. Id. at 246-48, 251; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985).
128. Neeley, supra note 126, at 246-248, 251; Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 CAL. RPTR.
297, 307-08 (Ct. App. 1986) (Compton, J. concurring).
129. Even if the legislative purpose is legitimate and substantial, "that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349 (1951).
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